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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Unsustainable  growth  in healthcare  expenditure  demands  effective  cost-containment  policies.  We
review  policy  effectiveness  using  total  payer  expenditure  as  primary  outcome  measure.  We  included
all  OECD  member  states  from  1970  onward.  After  a  rigorous  quality  appraisal,  we  included  43 original
studies  and  18  systematic  reviews  that cover  341 studies.  Policies  most  often  evaluated  were  payment
reforms  (10  studies),  managed  care  (8 studies)  and  cost  sharing  (6 studies).  Despite  the importance  of
this  topic,  for many  widely-used  policies  very  limited  evidence  is  available  on their  effectiveness  in con-
taining  healthcare  costs.  We  found  no  evidence  for  21 of  41  major  groups  of cost-containment  policies.
Furthermore,  many  evaluations  displayed  a high  risk  of  bias.  Therefore,  policies  should  be more  routinely
and  rigorously  evaluated  after  implementation.  The  available  high-quality  evidence  suggests  that  the  cost
curve  may  best  be bent  using  a combination  of cost  sharing,  managed  care  competition,  reference  pricing,
generic  substitution  and tort  reform.
© 2018  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The share of gross domestic product (GDP) spend on healthcare
is increasing in all member countries of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), from 4.6% of GDP
in 1970 to 9.0% of GDP in 2016 [1]. Despite a temporary slow-
down in the growth of healthcare spending during the fiscal crisis,
the pace of healthcare growth is again accelerating in many OECD
countries [1]. Growth is driven by a combination of factors: age-
ing populations and work-force, technological advances, changing
preferences due to higher incomes, higher wage growth due to lag-
ging productivity growth, and increased coverage [2]. Healthcare
expenditure is financed primarily collectively [3]. The capacity to
fund further health spending growth through increases in taxes and
premiums seems limited [4]. Hence, expanding healthcare budgets
may  increasingly pressure public spending in other areas, such as
education or infrastructure [5]. Furthermore, the healthcare sec-
tor is prone to inefficiencies such as unnecessary care, waste in
healthcare, unwarranted clinical practice variation, administrative
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burdens, fraud and abuse [6]. The combination of the limited capa-
bility of both the government and the economy to keep financing
high healthcare growth, plus the awareness about the existing inef-
ficiencies in healthcare, provides policymakers with a compelling
argument to contain healthcare costs.
Various countries have sought to address high healthcare cost
growth through myriad policies [7–9]. Many EU countries, for
example, have been experimenting with strict cost containment
policies during the fiscal crisis [10]. Salaries were reduced in France
and Ireland [11], and Greece likewise implemented policies to
cut physician’s wages and fees by 25% [12]. Health budgets were
reduced in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, amongst other coun-
tries [11]. Latvia and Bulgaria reduced the health budget by over
20% [11]. Although health systems differ, cost-containment poli-
cies have been remarkably similar across countries [13]. And while
the effects may  be context-dependent, still countries could learn
from each other’s experiences, especially regarding effectiveness
[14–16].
A large number of cost containment policies have been iden-
tified, targeting all aspects of the health system, such as prices,
volumes, supply, demand and market processes [13]. However,
the adaptability of the health system may  complicate attaining the
goal of containing total costs. For example, price reductions may
invoke volume increases [17–19], or compensation in other areas
[20,21]. Essentially, intervening in market processes may invoke
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2018.10.015
0168-8510/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
0/).
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Table 1
PICOS inclusion criteria.
Population Health sectors of OECD countries
Intervention Implementation of a cost
containment policy
Comparator Comparison over time, between
regions or between groups of
insured
Outcome Reduction in level or growth of:
•  Total expenditure
• Sector expenditure
• Public expenditure
• Total health insurance premiums
Study design Empirical policy evaluations
adverse behavioural responses [22,23]. Therefore, whether poli-
cies are effective in containing total spending remains an empirical
query.
To our knowledge, a robust overview of the available evidence
is lacking. The few reviews undertaken focus on areas such as phar-
maceuticals [24] or hospitals [25], Medicare and Medicaid [26],
payment reform [27,28], and efficiency [29]. None of these reviews
has systematically appraised the reliability and risk of bias of the
included articles. Moreover, most reviews do not assess the evi-
dence from a societal perspective. Instead, most studies in this
field take either a patient or provider perspective. Patient level
policies may  reduce patient treatment cost, but may  forego the
provider response to use the access capacity for additional care for
other patient groups. Similarly, provider level policies (e.g. hospi-
tals implementing policies to reduce their operating costs) may  fail
to incorporate additional burdens that may  fall on primary care
providers or other hospitals [30]. From a provider or patient per-
spective, reductions in treatment costs may  increase efficiency, but
due to possible spillovers to other sectors, providers or patients, the
effect on total expenditure is ambiguous [31]. This review takes
a societal perspective, focusing on expenditures of all payers and
patients. The aim of this review is threefold: (1) to summarise exist-
ing literature on the effectiveness of healthcare cost-containment
policies; (2) to identify knowledge gaps; and (3) to inform policy-
makers on promising cost-containment policies.
2. Materials and methods
We  performed a systematic review to identify evidence on the
effectiveness of known policy options to control payer expenditure.
Our approach follows the Centre for Reviews and Dissemina-
tion guidance protocol for undertaking reviews in healthcare [32].
Standard rapid review procedures were followed with respect to
handsearching journals, expert consultations and article transla-
tions [33]. Inclusion criteria are defined according to the Patient,
Intervention, Comparator, Outcome, Study design (PICOS) frame-
work (Table 1) [34].
Our primary outcome measure is total expenditures, covering all
payers, health sectors and patient out-of-pocket payments. Expen-
ditures of individual payers, such as governments (in National
Health Service systems), healthcare insurers (in Social Health Insur-
ance systems) or governmental organisations like Medicare and
Medicaid, are also included as outcome, although this inclusion
contains the risk of cost shifting to other payers or private spending.
Furthermore, sector expenditures, e.g. pharmaceutical spending,
are included as outcome, although this risks cost shifting to other
sectors. Therefore, from a societal perspective these outcome mea-
sures may  be less reliable than total expenditures. Single hospital
expenditures or single patient group expenditures are excluded as
outcome measures due to the very high risk of cost shifting.
Effective cost containment is defined as lower total expendi-
ture or payer expenditure compared to a control group, including
before-after comparisons within the same population and compar-
ison to a similar population (e.g. insured population of insurers,
regions or countries) [35]. Our study population is defined as the
insured population (enrolees) of one or more payers, either private
or public. This excludes studies using per patient expenditure, per
provider expenditure, volumes or prices as sole outcome measure.
Containing the cost per unit of service, i.e. improving efficiency [29],
is policy relevant as well, but beyond the scope of this review, as
are other policy aims such as quality, equity and access. This review
only includes OECD countries.
Using inductive pilot searches, relevant keywords were defined
for all inclusion criteria. A twofold strategy was  employed: a search
for cost-containment policies in general and a specific search for
individual policies that were identified as cost-containment poli-
cies [13]. The final search string (see Appendix A), was amended
with database specific glossary terms (MeSH terms). The follow-
ing databases were searched (June 2016): Pubmed, Medline, The
Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL),
Web  of Science and Econlit. After adding relevant articles from
a second cost-containment literature database [13], 7209 unique
articles were collected. After excluding irrelevant articles based on
title and abstract, 276 articles were screened in full text indepen-
dently by two researchers. References of the excluded reviews were
checked for relevant articles and screened using a similar process
as the original articles (see Appendix B for the Preferred Reporting
Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) flow
diagram).
We extracted relevant information of the included articles and
assessed the quality. To this aim, we reviewed ten quality assess-
ment tools [36–45]. Based on these validated frameworks, we
designed a quality assessment tool specifically for policy evalua-
tions (Appendix C). We  use five quality domains: content validity,
selection bias, confounding bias, measurement bias and reliability.
Literature reviews were assessed separately using A MeaSurement
Tool to Assess systematic Reviews (AMSTAR) [46]. The results of
the included systematic reviews were incorporated directly in the
narrative synthesis without a separate assessment of the papers
included in that review [47]. Two reviewers independently per-
formed quality assessments and review assessments.
To structure our results, we use an existing framework of
mutually exclusive groups, covering both macro-policies and
micro-interventions [13]. Comparing our results with this frame-
work allows detection of knowledge gaps, which may  inspire
future policy evaluations. Although other categorisations of cost-
containment policies exist [48–53], this categorisation was  deemed
most suitable to detect knowledge gaps.
3. Results
In total, 72 policies from 43 empirical papers and 18 system-
atic reviews were included. The 18 systematic reviews covered a
total of 341 studies. Of the 61 included articles, 1 took a societal
perspective, while 60 studies took a payer or sector perspective.
Overall, the included papers were of mixed quality. Of the 43 empir-
ical papers, 29 articles scored low on at least one of the five quality
domains. Systematic review ratings ranged from 3 out of 12 to 12
out of 12 points on the AMSTAR scale. We  were unable to per-
form a meta-analysis due to the methodological heterogeneity and
context dependency of the studies [54]. Therefore, results for each
intervention are discussed separately. First, we summarise the lit-
erature. Next, we identify knowledge gaps. Last, we synthesise the
results.
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3.1. Literature overview
Appendix D summarises our results, structured according to
each of the four primary policy groups: budgets, price controls,
volume controls and market-oriented policies, where – due to the
large number of articles – the last category is further subdivided
into market structure policies, market conduct policies and mar-
ket performance policies. We  briefly discuss the findings for each
intervention.
3.1.1. Budgets
Budgeting total or sector expenditures is a widespread policy
measure [55,56]. Despite their intuitive appeal, budgets are not
necessarily effective in containing spending. For example, budget
constraints may  be considered soft if hospitals expect a government
bail-out in case of overspending [57–59]. Therefore, effectiveness of
budgets as a cost containment tool is an empirical question. How-
ever, we could only include two studies at the payer level. The
introduction of the Balanced Budget Act in the US (1997) limited
total spending on Medicare by 112 billion dollar [60]. In response,
the Centre for Medicare and Medicaid Services introduced a series
of cost-containment measures, such as price reductions and pay-
ment reform. After two years, hospitals with higher exposure to
Medicare patients ended up with on average 9% lower revenues
than hospitals with low Medicare exposure, without declines in
actual volume [60]. A systematic review (2 studies) evaluated the
effectiveness of GP drug budgets; a significant reduction in phar-
maceutical expenses of 27%–70% was found in the UK, while a
non-significant reduction of 18%–27% was reported in Ireland [61].
3.1.2. Price controls
Price controls include limits on reimbursements (price setting,
fee schedules, price negotiations or reference pricing) and con-
trols of production factors (wages, profits, capital or pharmaceutical
inputs). The price of pharmaceuticals in turn may  be set based on
prices in other countries (external reference pricing) or based on
prices of comparator drugs (internal reference pricing). We  found
two studies on price limits, one study on profit controls, one review
on reference pricing (16 studies), one study on external reference
pricing, one review on generic substitution (8 studies) and one
additional study on generic substitution.
Hospital price cuts due to the US Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act (1989) has been estimated to reduce spending by 6% for
every 10% reduction in price [62]. Reductions in US Medicare home-
care prices as a result of the Home Health Interim Payment System
(1997) have shown to reduce both use and costs of homecare with-
out any effect on mortality [63]. A systematic review found no
evidence for pharmaceutical profit controls for Ireland [64].
One systematic review (16 studies) concluded that internal ref-
erence pricing lowered payer spending in most cases, but also
increased patient cost sharing, resulting in a marginal reduction in
total expenditure [64]. A Danish reform (2005), replacing external
reference pricing with internal reference pricing, reduced phar-
maceutical spending by 10% [65]. One review found lower costs
in four of its eight included studies on substitution from brand-
name drugs to clinically equivalent counterparts (generics), while
no difference was found in clinical outcomes [66]. The authors com-
mented that although acquisition costs of the target drug declined,
increases in inpatient and outpatient utilisation compensated for
this. This specific review did not take into account the possibility
that pharmaceutical companies may  increase prices of other drugs
as a result of generic substitution [67]. Contrary to these findings, a
study on mandatory generic substitution between 1997 and 1999
found drug cost reductions of $36 to $52 (a significant 8% reduction)
per health plan member [68].
3.1.3. Volume controls
We  found evidence for 17 interventions that aim to con-
trol volumes from seven studies and ten reviews (179 studies).
Four interventions target supply, and thirteen interventions tar-
get demand for care, specifically cost sharing (6 interventions) and
benefit restrictions (5 interventions).
Already in 1974 the RAND Health Insurance Experience (HIE)
demonstrated in a large randomised controlled trial that cost shar-
ing can contain expenditure [69,70]. We  included six papers that
confirmed this finding. One review (12 studies) found that high-
deductible consumer directed health plans (CDHC) reduced plan
expenditure with 5%–15%, corrected for enrolee characteristics
[71]. Plans with high coinsurance also bared lower expendi-
ture [72]. One review (29 studies) concluded that both user
charges and coinsurance lower drug expenditures [64]. A sec-
ond review (19 studies) reported drug cost savings even after
a small increase in copayments, but also found reduced access
to necessary medications [73]. In addition, insurance plans with
higher drug copayments were found to have 27% lower phar-
maceutical expenditures. Additionally, two-tier plans with higher
copayments for branded drugs had lower spending than single tier
plans (7–22%). Extra copayments for non-preferred brands had an
additional cost-decreasing effect (2–7%) [68]. Also for independent
practice associations, increasing pharmaceutical copayments from
$5.00 to $7.50 resulted in an estimated 12% reduction in pharma-
ceutical expenditures. For Health Maintenance Organisations, the
reduction of pharmaceutical expenditure (3%) was  non-significant,
suggesting either that copayments were less effective in managed
networks or that pharmaceutical adherence was  better guarded by
these plans [74].
Prior authorisation policies and utilisation review policies may
contain costs by reducing overtreatment. A review on prior autho-
risation (6 studies) found drug-related cost savings [75]. One study
demonstrated that drug utilisation review programs reduced total
drug expenditures by 7% [76]. According to a recent review (6 stud-
ies), prescription caps contain expenditures. However, access to
essential drugs may  decrease [64].
Mixed results were found for benefit restrictions. One review
(9 studies) on prescribing restrictions found either lower costs (6
studies), no significant effect (2 studies), or even higher costs (1
study) [77]. A second review (30 studies) found that reimbursement
restrictions predominantly contain costs but could lower patient
outcomes [64]. A third review (12 studies) on benefit restrictions
found no effect on total costs, primarily due to substitution towards
other therapies [73]. A fourth review (59 studies) on managed care
formulary restrictions found policies to be effective in 34%, neutral
in 37% and ineffective in 29% of the studies [78]. One additional
study from South Korea found no significant effects after delisting
certain drugs [79].
The effectiveness of patient education to limit demand is
also mixed. A review (2 studies) found no cost savings after a
patient education program in Spain; in North America direct-to-
consumer advertisements to reduce use of certain specific drugs
even increased expenditures for these drugs [64]. However, a ran-
domised health promotion intervention for enrolees of a large
Californian health plan, consisting of health assessments, educa-
tion material and participant motivation, reduced claims by $3.2 to
$8.0 million, between 1989 and 1991 [80].
3.1.4. Market structure policies
We found 22 interventions from 16 studies and 6 reviews (101
studies) aiming to adjust market structure to contain costs. Most
studies target payer structure, e.g. by stimulating use of managed
care organizations (MCOs).
Earlier studies showed predominantly cost-containing effects
of MCOs. A 10% increase in MCO  market penetration reduced pre-
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mium growth by 7% [72]. MCOs were estimated to have between 8%
and 15% lower costs in competitive regional markets [81]. Higher
MCO  market penetration led to annual hospital savings of 7% in Cal-
ifornia [82]. MCO  penetration seems to have spillover effects; a 1%
increase in MCO  market share is associated with a 0.9% decrease
in fee-for-service (FFS) insurance costs [83]. Due to the managed
care backlash in the US, MCOs lost importance for the private mar-
kets [83], although Medicare and Medicaid continued to rely on
managed care as alternative service providers. However, studies
that evaluated Medicaid-managed care models found no significant
effects on total costs [84,85]. European experiences with managed
care are also mixed. A study from Switzerland found large cost
reductions due to managed care, up to 16% compared to tradi-
tional insurance [86]. This could be due to patient selection, as
the effect on other insurers has not been taken into account. For
German insurers, evidence for patient selection in managed care
contracts was found. Managed care contracts increased the costs
of pharmaceuticals in neighbouring regions and, as a result, total
pharmaceutical expenditure increased by 0.2% to 0.8% following
each percent increase in managed care penetration [87]. For other
forms of payer reforms, limited evidence was found. One study
found short-term cost reductions of 30% to 40% due to mental
health carve-outs, explained by a combination of financial incen-
tives, reputation effects, patient selection and case management
[88].
Payers could reduce cost by altering provision structures and
types of providers. One study found 4% cost savings after a Swiss
insurer offered telecare as substitute of regular care [86]. An inter-
vention in Florida to provide hospice care and cancer care to nursing
home residents reduced government spending by 8% [89]. No sig-
nificant cost reductions were found for patient-centered medical
homes (PCMHs) [90,91]. Reviews on rehabilitation care (0 studies)
[92] or mental health community care (42 studies) [93] also found
no cost savings. Such results indicate that it may  be challenging to
launch these provision models that lower costs in the short term
whilst also improving quality [91].
As countries have been searching for the optimal level of govern-
ment involvement, waves of decentralisation and recentralization
have been observed across Europe [94,95]. For example, in the UK,
commissioning centralized to district health authorities in 1974
[96], decentralized to NHS thrusts and fundholding in 1991 and
to primary care trusts 2001, and recentralized in 2013 with the
conception of clinical commissioning groups [97]. Even in tradi-
tionally decentralized countries, e.g. Finland and Denmark, a trend
towards centralization has been discerned [98,99]. Decentralisa-
tion has been proposed as a measure to contain costs [13]. However,
conflicting evidence was found. A multi-country analysis found
between 12% and 25% higher cost growth among more decen-
tralised systems [100]. A study on decentralisation in the Spanish
NHS found short-term cost increases of 9%–16%, but thereafter a
diminished cost growth of 0.5%–1% on an annual basis [101].
Registered nurses, nursing assistants, pharmacists or primary
care physicians may  perform some tasks and procedures tradition-
ally performed by medical specialists more cheaply. One review
(11 studies) found that substitution of tasks towards nursing assis-
tants and pharmacists may  lower expenditure, although the quality
of the evidence is deemed too low to draw general conclusions
[102]. A second review (3 studies) report marginally lower costs
of delegating tasks to primary care physicians on emergency care
departments [103].
Non-profit and public providers seem to operate with lower
expenses. One review (8 studies) found that for-profit providers
on average charge 19% higher prices than non-profit providers
[104]. A second review (37 studies) found 23 economic compar-
isons that favoured non-profit ownership, 5 that favoured for-profit
ownership and 9 that were inconclusive [105]. A final study found
for-profit MCOs to be more costly per member, although their
results were not consistent [106].
3.1.5. Market conduct policies
Evaluations of policies aiming to reduce cost by influencing
market conduct primarily focused on the effects of competition,
payment reform and care coordination. In the latter category, a
number of case management programs have been evaluated. The
Illinois Health Connect and Your Healthcare Plus intervention pro-
duced savings of 7% and 9%, respectively [107]. A Medicaid primary
care case management program showed maximal program savings
of 7% in Medicaid expenditure [108]. An evaluation of Medicare case
management for high-risk patients found cost savings of $7.7 mil-
lion over three years, rendering a Return on Investment ratio (ROI)
of 1.40. Reductions in readmissions and increases in appropriate
medication were found [109]. A health management program of a
large California employer saved between $8.4 million and $8.8 mil-
lion, rendering a ROI ratio of between 4.56 and 4.73 [110]. Although
one study showed per patient cost decreases of $89 for high risk
patients due to case management, these savings were insufficient
to cover the total costs of the program [111]. For other forms of care
coordination, less evidence was  available. One study demonstrated
that GP continuity in Belgium lowered expenditure by 11% [112].
Competition has proven to contain costs in California dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s. A study on pro-competitive reforms
found cost decreases of 12% in high competition regions [113].
Lower growth of expenses could also be noted in comparison with
states that relied on non-competitive strategies [114]. Cost con-
tainment retained over the long-term, even increasing bankruptcy
risk for public hospitals [115]. Contrary to the California experi-
ence, another study found that neither competition, nor regulation
contained expenditures. Supply-side factors (e.g. per capita supply
of hospital beds and prevalence of specialists) were found to be the
main determinants of expenditure growth [116]. One recent study
on hospital competition in the UK found no effect on expenditures,
although positive effects on quality of care were found [117].
Payment reforms aim to align incentives of providers and pay-
ers. In Switzerland, expenditures of capitated networks were 6%
lower than networks paid on a fee-for-service base [86]. For Med-
icaid, capitating GP payments reduced utilisation, but increased
expenditures by $75 per patient due to the high payments neces-
sary to include a sufficient number of physicians into the program
[118]. Experiences from Medicaid mental health capitation in Col-
orado showed moderate cost reduction for the first two years,
ranging from 0.5% for for-profit providers to 0.2% for non-profit
providers; however, after two years the effects turned insignificant
[119]. Interestingly, cost-containment effects were larger forprofit
providers, while for-profit status is associated with higher costs.
This stipulates that for-profit providers may  react more strongly
to financial incentives. A literature review (9 studies) on the fis-
cal effects of P4P found mixed effects; the three most rigorous
evaluations did not find any significant savings [120]. However, a
more recent study on P4P for GPs found 1% lower expenditures as
well as higher quality of care [121]. Another review found no cost
evaluations of target payments for general physicians [122].
Prospective payments and DRG payments fix per-patient prices
irrespective of the number of activities per diagnosis. For a com-
prehensive overview of the implementation of DRGs in Europe,
see Busse et al. (2011) [123]. Following the implementation of
Medicare PPS in 1984, significant reductions in hospital expen-
diture were found [124,125]. However, DRGs replacing per diem
payment in New Jersey showed no significant cost reductions, as
price reductions were offset by volume increases [126]. While DRGs
may  increase efficiency [127], evidence on total spending is mixed.
Implementation of a Medicare prospective payment system for
home care in 2000 comprised a fixed per patient payment and a
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variable component, depending on treatment intensity. The fixed
component was increased by the reform, while the variable compo-
nent was reduced. In net, the reform slightly increased utilisation
and expenditure, suggesting that incentives to increase the num-
ber of patients seem to have outweighed the incentives to contain
per-patient costs [63].
3.1.6. Market performance policies
According to theory, structure and conduct of the market
determine the market outcome [128]. However, health sector per-
formance can be improved irrespective of market structure and
conduct by targeting inefficiencies outside the primary health
production process, like reducing administrative costs, waste or
fraud. Of all policies targeting non-health costs, only evaluations
of health IT and tort reform were found. A literature review
on health IT adoption, such as electronic health records, com-
puterised physician order entry, and clinical decision supports,
found cost-containment effects, specifically administrative costs
and pharmaceutical expenses, in 43 out of a total of 57 evaluations
[129]. Tort reform has been shown to decrease defensive medicine
and liability premiums, lowering expenditure in the US by 2%–4%
[130,131].
4. Synthesis
Although interventions were very heterogeneous, some general
trends are visible. We  found evidence that cost sharing contained
total health expenditure [71,72] as well as pharmaceutical expendi-
ture [64,68,73,74]. Evaluations of case management interventions
predominantly showed cost savings [107–110]. However, most of
these programs do rely on voluntary participation by patients,
thus risking selection bias. Insurer competition has been found to
contain costs in California [113–115]. Furthermore, unnecessary
treatments may  be reduced by prior authorisation [75] and utili-
sation review [76]. Controlling access to care, e.g. by caps on the
number of prescriptions [64], could also help to contain pharma-
ceutical expenditure. Lastly, price limits and budgets may  also be
effective in containing total payer expenses [60–63].
Other policies show more contradicting results. Payer struc-
ture policies for example, specifically those promoting managed
care organizations, has shown to either lower costs [72,81–83,86],
increase costs [87] or have no effect on costs [84,85]. Payment
reform and prospective payments in some cases seem to lower
costs [86,119,121] but in other instances they increase costs
[63,118] or have no effect on costs [120,122,126]. For-profit pro-
vision seems to increase expenses, although not consistently
[104–106]. Despite the fact that many countries rely on benefit
package restrictions to contain pharmaceutical expenditure, evi-
dence did not consistently indicate cost savings [64,73,77–79].
4.1. Identification of knowledge gaps
To identify gaps in the literature, the results are plotted in the
overview of cost-containment policies by Stadhouders et al. (2016).
Fig. 1 shows that no evaluations were found in 21 of 41 categories.
For price controls, evidence on fee schedules and price negotiations
is lacking. Regarding supply side volume controls, we  found no evi-
dence for capacity controls, such as limits on the number of beds
or the number of providers through certificate-of-needs policies,
or for labour restrictions, such as limiting the number of practi-
tioners. For demand controls, no evidence evaluating the effects
of prevention on a payer level has been included. Additionally, no
evaluations of policies limiting the pace of costly innovations were
found. In the category of market structure policies, we were unable
to include evaluations of antitrust policy, such as merger controls,
or risk redistribution, such as risk equalisation programs. No eval-
uations were found on the effects of consumer choice, contracting
policies or patient choice in the category of market conduct poli-
cies. Lastly, no papers were included on administrative reductions,
fraud control, waste reduction programs, managerial improvement
policies, transparency increases or cost-reducing innovations.
4.2. High-quality evidence to guide policymaking
General effects of cost-containment policies are difficult to distil
due to the non-random nature of the interventions and the depen-
dency on context. Therefore, we base our policy recommendations
on the most robust evidence. Of 43 studies, 13 had low to medium
risk of bias and high to medium content validity and reliability.
High-quality studies were more likely to find no effect. No effect
was found for delisting of benefits, decentralisation, case manage-
ment, managed care and hospital competition [79,101,111,117].
However, some high-quality papers do find significant cost-
saving effects. Firstly, cost sharing could reduce costs. One study
found that deductibles and coinsurance are associated with lower
premium growth rates [72]. Another study found (tiered) copay-
ments to be effective [68]. Secondly, both managed care and
competition have the potential to reduce costs. A 10% increase in
HMO  market share reduced premium growth with 6.5% between
1985 and 1992 [72]. In addition, long-term effects of cost contain-
ment through competitive reforms were found [115]. Cost sharing
and competitive reform may  go hand-in-hand; managed care might
increase competition, and competition on premiums may benefit
plans with high cost sharing [132]. Also for reductions of phar-
maceutical spending, high-quality evidence is available. Internal
reference pricing reduced pharmaceutical spending in Denmark
by over 10% [65]. Closely related, generic substitution was shown
to reduce pharmaceutical spending by 8% [68]. Lastly, two high-
quality studies point to the potential of cost reductions in specific
areas such as end-of-life care and tort reform [89,130].
5. Discussion
Cost containment in healthcare is a leading policy challenge.
Hence, identifying effective policies is vital, but articles evaluat-
ing policies on a macro-level are limited and often lack sufficient
rigor. Low numbers of evaluations per policy make it challeng-
ing to infer effect sizes as well as time- country-, and health
system dependency [133]. Many policy options seem understud-
ied and this includes routine strategies such as budgeting and
price setting. All OECD countries would benefit from collective
efforts to experiment with, and rigorously evaluate promising poli-
cies. As policies are often similar, country heterogeneity may be
viewed as a strength. Many different approaches have been taken
to tackle rising expenditure. Policymakers should harvest from the
wide range of experiences, in order to identify the opportunities
and challenges of various policy tools. Countries could then fine-
tune cost-containment policies to their own  setting, identifying
and accounting for divergent and paramount contextual factors.
Considering the above, the lack of evaluations of effectiveness is
disappointing.
Despite a broad search strategy and not overly limiting exclu-
sion criteria, only 61 papers were included. Several factors might
account for this. First, it may  be challenging to isolate the effect of
many policy interventions. For example, most containment poli-
cies are part of a broader reform package [134]. Also, some policies
exert effects in the long run which may  be difficult to isolate. Even
for policies that prove effective in the short run, it is questionable
whether any significant effect endures in the long run. Second, poli-
cies may  have been rigorously evaluated but not included in our
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Fig. 1. Summary of findings and effects per policy group.
search strategy, for example because these evaluations were not
published in the peer-reviewed literature or have been written in
another language. Of the 61 papers included in this review, 44 are
from the US. This bias could be alleviated by inclusion of evalu-
ations published outside the peer-reviewed literature or in other
languages. Last, and probably most important, a large number of
studies evaluated costs from the patient or provider perspective
and not from the perspective of the payers. Including such studies
would greatly increase the number of papers, although the evi-
dence would be much less robust because cost substitution may  be
mistaken for cost containment.
This review gives a broad overview of the literature, point-
ing towards effectiveness of certain specific policies such as cost
sharing, managed care competition, reference pricing, generic sub-
stitution and tort reform. However, some reservations should
be made regarding desirability of these measures. Cost sharing,
for example, may  reduce both necessary and unnecessary care
[135–137]. Second, it could disproportionally affect access by low
income groups, which may  be undesirable from an ethical per-
spective [138]. It is also highly unpopular with the electorate and
thus comes with political barriers. Thirdly, cost sharing shifts costs
to patients, thereby limiting the effect on total healthcare costs.
Lastly, cost sharing could have spillover effects to other payers
when providers increase treatment intensity of remaining patients
[139]. Control of pharmaceutical expenditure by reference pricing
and generic substitution is promising. However, attention should
be given to the possibilities of pharmaceutical companies shifting
costs to unregulated areas [67], or patients shifting to more expen-
sive treatments [73]. Tort reform appears an issue specific to the
US.
A substantial body of evidence favours better coordination of
care as an effective way to contain cost. This was one of the
few policies where mostly positive effects on the quality of care
were reported. However, studies on care coordination often con-
tained a high risk of bias due to self-selection into the program of
patients and organisations that have a high propensity to obtain
a positive effect. Therefore, the actual implementation of proven
concepts of care coordination to other settings may  be challenging
[140]. Furthermore, case management often comes with substan-
tial upfront costs [141]. Although politically appealing, this strategy
faces difficult implementation barriers on a short horizon with
many different steps and is often highly dependent on specific local
conditions.
Most studies show mixed and context-dependent results. For
example, payment reforms are often thought to have substantial
cost saving potential [142]. However, no such effect was found
consistently, suggesting that payment schemes should be designed
with great care to prevent undesirable provider responses and to
sort out positive effects on costs and quality. Evidently, policies
are interconnected and embedded in a broader health system and
some may  be reinforced or counteracted by other policies [29]. For
example competition: under certain conditions, competition may
contain costs and specific types of payers (e.g. MCOs) may  reinforce
this; however, a higher penetration of for-profit providers may lead
to higher costs. Moreover, the effect of competition, profit status or
payer types may  depend on the payment system in place. Mapping
policy interrelations and institutions should be an important part
of future research on this topic. The adoption of cost-containment
policies likely depends on other policy goals such as quality of
care, equity and efficiency. In many instances, the pursuit of a
cost-containment strategy may  come at the cost of one or more of
these goals. This would require balance of cost-containment efforts
with other important health system goals. Future research should
inquire into policy outcomes on all relevant policy metrics and
design combinations that sort out an optimal effect.
6. Concluding remarks
We  collected evidence on the effectiveness of cost-containment
policies from a payer perspective, and included 43 original
studies and 18 systematic reviews evaluating 72 different cost-
containment policies. We  compared policy evaluations to policies
identified in the literature. Of the 41 groups of cost containment
policies, 21 were not evaluated, and even within the remaining
groups several policies remain unevaluated. The existing evidence
shows that the effectiveness of cost containment policies varies
greatly between policies, underlining the need for evidence. Future
policy evaluations should focus on the effectiveness of fee sched-
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ules, wage controls, capacity controls, prevention and reductions
in administrative costs. Special attention should be given to the
payer and societal perspective as many evaluations do not take into
account cost shifting possibilities by providers and patients.
We summarised the available evidence, providing a broad
overview of the literature on effective cost-containment policies.
Most evaluations were performed for MCO  competition, payment
reforms, cost sharing and care coordination. High-quality evidence
favors cost sharing, managed care competition, reference pricing,
generic substitution and tort reform as effective policies to contain
costs. Policymakers aiming to contain costs should resort to these
policies to maximise chances of success.
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